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Abstract
In this paper, a comparative approach was pursued to show differences but also 
remarkable similarities between the application of analogy in popular science texts and 
in specialized science texts. Setting out from an initial hypothesis that popular texts use 
forms of analogy that lend themselves to direct interpretation and high accessibility, 
we try to show that actual specialized science discourse could benefi t from simpler and 
more versatile analogy. For this end, the current state of the art in analogy research was 
evaluated and a corpus of academic texts was queried. Further, a number of approaches 
and fi ndings could be contributed as a direct outcome of the international Analogy – Copy 
– Representation workshop held at Bielefeld University in November 2014, which was 
co-organized by the author. In consequence, a more comprehensive picture of analogy in 
cognition, language and scientifi c discourse is sketched in this contribution. Especially the 
domain-dependence of the use of analogies showed surprising results.
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1 Introduction
The modern study of analogy begins with Gentner’s seminal 1983 paper but 
of course the phenomenon is in use since ancient times when rhetoric was more 
relevant than today. It is rooted in the human ability to recognize analogy as 
a foundational mechanism of human cognition. Itkonen says this very clearly: 
“Analogy is generally defi ned as ‘structural similarity’” (Itkonen 2005:1) but 
recognizing this similarity is a higher cognitive function. Extending from this 
we can state that analogy is defi ned as the similarity relationship that persists 
across different domains. Setting out from this similarity, Gentner (2001) 
uses analogy as the extension of this primary relationship (one aspect of one 
phenomenon is similar to a second aspect in a second phenomenon) to describe 
a secondary relationship: If the primary relationship holds, then other aspects of 
the one phenomenon may be similar to the second phenomenon too. Necessarily, 
the phenomena are not restricted to visual or linguistic phenomena but also to 
abstract or logical phenomena as our initial example from the SPACE corpus 
(sample 0034AX, physics component, to be described in Section 4 shows:
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0034AX There are three main mechanisms and respective sites to accelerate 
particles in the Galaxy: supernova explosions either in the interstellar medium, in 
young and hot starbubbles, or in massive star winds.
The structural similarities in this text from a specialized scientifi c paper are 
simple to decode: mechanisms refer to cause-effect machinery in which one 
module interlocks with another (abstract or logical relationship); star bubbles 
receive the description from real-life bubbles (soap or else) and star winds 
combine the structural similarity of a logical phenomenon (directed movement) 
with a visual one (striations in photographic images).
A systematic study of how these analogies are applied may lead to a more 
appropriate usage and thus enhanced understanding on the side of the reader 
although achieving this goal requires a comprehensive survey of different 
domains.
2 Analogy in science and mind: A brief ‘state of the art’
Analogy-making is a central idea in the cognitive sciences. We may 
differentiate between two fundamental processes: 
a)  the gestalt recognition that goes beyond mere shape recognition (this 
links up with the non-visual phenomena);
b)  the sequence of re-imagining, translation/transformation and enhancement 
(cf. Changeux & Connes 1995).
Both processes need to be preceded by a goal or purpose. This purpose is very 
often inference-making from unknown situations or the modeling/pre-modeling 
of unknown situations. The envisaged situation is brought in coordination 
with memorized situations that had one or more aspects in common with the 
envisaged one. Thus, successful inferencing may ensue on the basis of the 
similarity. This shows the basic components for successful analogy-making: 
the necessary consistency of mapping a source on a target due to structural 
properties. Structural properties of a 1:1 consistency in source and target enable 
this mapping; a situation or a problem is understood in terms of the components 
of a different situation or problem.
Further, analogy-making is a central notion in anthropology for structure-
building processes in cultures. These processes defi ne culture based on an 
understanding of nature as imitation and the recognition of oppositions. The 
mapping of these oppositions onto cultural processes has been termed analogue 
transfer by Lévi-Strauss (1967). It generates all relevant cultural categories, as in 
spatial extensions and ethno-methodological ontologies.
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In linguistics, analogy-making is the basis for conceptual metaphor theory 
(CMT) by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and its derivates like conceptual blending 
(Fauconnier & Turner 2002). Thus, analogy is at the heart of cognitive linguistics, 
for strategies of categorization in vertical system (Evans & Green 2006) or radial 
systems (Wierzbicka 2006).
In other humanities, analogy-making is a refl ective and analytic principle of 
creation as in the visual arts or with the leitmotif technique in music.
2.1 Analogy as a cognitive phenomenon
Analogy-making is pervasive in cognitive action. Fauconnier (1997: 20) 
summarizes this as follows:
Analogical mapping is so commonplace that we take it for granted. But 
it is one of the great mysteries of cognition. Given the richness of the 
domains and their complexity, how are the right schemas consistently 
extracted, elaborated, and applied to further mappings? And what are 
these schemas and generic frames that structure our conceptual systems 
so pervasively?
Gentner (2001: 17) isolates three plausible subordinated processes:
a)  the mapping of representative structures of base situations onto target 
situations (structural alignment);
b) the projection of inferences;
c) the evaluation.
All three processes can be illustrated with corpus examples:
a)  0064NS But Cooke says that in another round of experiments they fed the mice 
amounts of genistein equivalent to those given to babies in soya formula.
The base situation of soya formula milk given to babies is mapped onto the target 
situation, genistein fed to mice.
b)  0052NS Elderly rats have rediscovered their youth by eating two simple dietary 
supplements sold in healthfood shops. If the regime works in humans, it could 
make for a sprightly old age.
The inference originates in the rejuvenation of elderly rats. Applied to humans 
the rationale is that it may work for them too.
c)  0009NS The team modelled the Universe as an entity with four dimensions of 
space and time called a “brane”, embedded in a background space with fi ve or 
more dimensions. We perceive only the four dimensions, just as people in earlier 
times thought the Earth was fl at instead of a 3D sphere.
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Here, the reader is led to follow the evaluation of the author (together with the 
scientists) that the difference between 5 dimensional space and our 4D-perception 
corresponds with the assumption of 3D-perception on a 2D-Earth.
The most infl uential theory to emerge from this is Gentner’s structural 
alignment theory (1983). Here, a familiar situation (the base) is used as a 
template for inductive reasoning in a target situation. Single elements of the base 
situation are recognized as parallel or similar to elements of the target. Further, 
relations between base elements are mapped onto relations between elements of 
the target. This generates a set of candidate inferences (cf. Gentner 2001) which 
are constrained only by limitations of general order (like world knowledge, 
natural laws if applicable, causality, etc.). Gentner formulates as a requirement 
the structural well-formedness, factual validity and relevance for the target 
(ibid: 17).
An alternative theory is Holyoak and Thagard’s goal-oriented theory (1989). 
It emphasizes the primacy of the goal and puts analogies into the role of a tool 
to reach said goals. The direction of the analogy-making can be towards the 
target (called projection-fi rst modeling) but also retrograde from the target to 
a model of the base (and both are compared afterwards). The resulting model 
is a desired outcome of the inferencing but it can also emerge incrementally 
from the mapping function itself (alignment-fi rst modeling, cf. Hofstadter 1994). 
Especially the latter theory is more relevant in general problem solving because 
the structural well-formedness very often plays a second role to pragmatic 
constraints. In scientifi c analogy-making these constraints are especially viable 
and important (cf. Section 4). Thus, in conclusion, analogy-making in cognition 
is mainly goal-oriented as this also offers evolutionary incentives. 
2.2 Analogy as a device in scientifi c discourse
Analogy in scientifi c discourse needs entrenchment from the related terms of 
homology and anomaly. Homology (from Greek for ‘correspondence’) is used 
in biology to denote organs that show fundamental similarities across species 
boundaries and over long periods of time. A classic example is the larynx of 
humans and chimpanzees which has the same physiological function and looks 
very similar. However, humans have a lowered larynx and it is this detail that 
enables vocal speech. The chimp homology is a conduit for air and food and 
not much else. The wings of birds and insects may serve as a counter-example. 
They are analogs but no homologies as they have the same or a similar function 
(fl ying, hovering in midair) but they have no evolutionary correspondence. 
A similar pairing of form and function comes from the distinction between 
analogy and anomaly. Aristotle (an analogician) sees for instance language as a 
set of forms with an inner order. Ancient anomalists did not deny the function 
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of language but they saw their gestalt as chaotic. Even though the analogue 
approach enables the defi nition of categories, the discussion itself is still viral, 
for example in typology (cf. Aarts 2007).
The sciences have a long and uninterrupted history of using analogy-making 
as a tool for understanding (cf. Table 1) but also for outreach in science education 
(cf. Section 2.3).
A short summary can be found in Harrison and Treagust (2006):
Maxwell used water pressure in tubes to mathematically describe Faraday’s electric 
lines of force
Robert Boyle imagined elastic gas particles as moving coiled springs
Huygens used water waves to theorise that light was wavelike
Konrad Lorenz used analogy to explain streamlined motion both in birds and fi sh
Kekulé derived his idea for a benzene ring from an image of a snake biting its tail
Table 1: Scientifi c discovery and analogical thinking (adapted from Harrison & Treagust 
2006: 15)
Thus, “[A]nalogy and metaphor are central to scientifi c thought” (Gentner 
& Jeziorski 1993: 447) even though the examples in Table 1 may seem overly 
simplistic. Incidentally, Gentner returns in almost all treatments on analogy to the 
example of Rutherford’s analogy of his atomic model to a miniature solar system. 
While this has been an infl uential device in the early phases of modern physics 
(the early 20th century) when it replaced Thompsons’s ‘plum pudding’ model – 
the electrons are embedded in a positively charged mass (Hawley & Holcomb 
2005: 87), today other and very persistent analogies are perpetuated. This may 
be illustrated with the relatively recent theory of an infl ationary phase after the 
big bang. The expansion of the primordial universe has almost unequivocally 
been likened to the expansion of a balloon on which spots have been painted. 
As the balloon infl ates, all spots move away from each other but not away from 
a common center. This analog is even used in academic books on cosmology 
(cf. ibid: 299-300). Readers are usually asked to take this analog one dimension 
higher and the spots on the balloon surface are the galaxies in the observable 
universe, all moving away from each other. This also explains why the universe 
does not have a center and the analogy tries to steer the popular reader away from 
the common misconception of the big bang as an explosion. 
The image of the big bang as a cosmic explosion ejecting the material 
contents of the universe like shrapnel from an exploding bomb is a useful 
ne to bear in mind, but it is a little misleading. When a bomb explodes, 
it does so at a particular location in space and at a particular moment in 
time. … In the big bang there is no surrounding space. (Greene 2003: 83; 
italics in the original)
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However, the picture gets more complicated with the infl ationary model 
of the universe to which fi rst empirical evidence was found as this paper was 
conceived (March-April 2014). The new model requires to think of a “balloon 
producing balloons producing balloons” (in a conversation with the eminent 
cosmologist Linde; cf. http://edge.org/conversation/a-balloon-producing-
balloons-producing-balloons-a-big-fractal-).
The systematicity of the old analog is therefore extended but the base for it 
uses the target (the balloon) of the old model. We can speak of hierarchically 
structured analogs (cf. Wilson et al. 2001: 125).
2.3 Analogy as a pedagogical tool (also in the sciences)
The change of analogy as a pedagogical tool is refl ected in the change of the 
state of knowledge of the natural phenomena that are described by them. This is 
what Gentner (2002) calls an “ontological change”, illustrated with the following 
table of a pre-Keplerian and a post-Keplerian model of the solar system:
BEFORE AFTER
Planetary system is governed by 
mathematical laws
Planetary system is governed by physical 
causality
Planets’ orbits are crystalline spheres 
containing planets or eternal circles 
traveled by planetary intelligences
Planets’ orbits are paths continually 
negotiated between the Sun and the 
planets
… Planetary paths are perfect circles of 
uniform speed
… Planetary paths are ellipses, faster 
when closer to the Sun and slower when 
further from the Sun
Anima motrix as “spirit” in Sun that 
moves planets
Vis motrix as “force” from Sun that 
moves planets
Table 2: Conceptual change (adapted from Gentner 2002: 27)
While a few of the examples in Gentner’s table walk the fi ne line between 
metaphor and analogy (‘orbits are spheres’), there is a marked didactic difference 
between metaphor and analogy. In the sciences, metaphor is predominantly used 
for commitment. Metaphor enables entailments that suggest a new range of ideas, 
also by expressing an abstract idea in familiar terms (Aubusson et al. 2006: 2-4). 
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3 The linguistics of analogy
3.1 Overview
Analogy in the description of linguistic phenomena has an implicit problem 
due to the fact that it has been used generously to cover a wide area of relationships. 
In this section, the main approaches are classifi ed and in the last step focused on 
the corpus study.
The fi rst bridge between cognitive behavior and language is the acquisition 
of analogy. In fi rst language acquisition, analogy is defi ned as the “process that 
allows children to produce new grammatical forms by generalizing the structure 
of forms they already know” (Bornstein & Lamb 2011: 441).
The approach that has achieved a somewhat dominant status in linguistic 
analogy research is connected with the terms ‘proportional analogy’ and 
‘analogical leveling’. In simple terms, a is to b what c is to d (a:b :: c:d). This 
can be demonstrated on the systematic changes in English plural formation. The 
regular plural -s stands in opposition to only very few irregular forms (focus/foci, 
child/children, etc.). However, in fi rst and second language acquisition, learners 
make forms that are irregular to the regular paradigm (like child/childs). Further, 
this can also be observed in historical processes. For example the irregular cou/
kine was abandoned and regularized fi rst to cou/cows, then to cow/cows. (Credits 
for this and the following example go to Marion Schulte of Bielefeld University). 
On the other hand, the extension of an irregular paradigm is rare but there is 
a small number of examples. For example the pattern drive/drove is mapped 
onto the regular dive/dived which as a consequence becomes dive/dove in some 
varieties of English (Blevins & Blevins 2010: 6). This latter type of ‘morphology 
by analog’ seems according to Hay and Baayen (2002) not qualitatively different 
to regular paradigms. Further, this argument is used in generative approaches to 
reject the power of analogy in linguistics. But it was especially in morphology 
where at an early stage the descriptive rules were little more than very general 
applications of analogy, cf. Bauer: “[I]t could be that speakers work with analogy, 
but that linguists’ descriptions of the output of this behavior are in terms of rules. 
It may also be that rule systems presuppose analogy: they must start somewhere” 
(2001: 97). However, the simplicity of this approach (also favored by standard 
treatments of word formation like Plag (2003) is somewhat attacked by Hock 
(2005) and others who see little systematicity in word formation processes like 
clipping and blending (Hock 2005). Thus, at this pivotal point in morphology, the 
debate seems at an impasse. Summarized here in a nutshell as:
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a) morphological rule application is analogy-making; vs.
b)  morphological rule application and analogy-making are independent 
processes.
The proponents of b) have a strong point in asking, why is analogy-making 
so unpredictable? Plag (2003: 38) summarizes: “[I]t is unclear why certain 
analogies are often made while others are never made. In a rule-based system 
this follows from the rule itself”. The proponents of a), however, may interject 
that the rule must come from somewhere.
3.2 Analogy and metaphor and analogical modeling
While analogy and metaphor are often treated as two sides of the same coin, 
there are marked differences not only in its linguistic representations but also 
in its conceptual origin. While ametaphor (in the sense that ‘A is said to be B’) 
(Aubusson et al. 2006: 2), an analogy like ‘particles are ping-pong balls’ would 
claim ‘A is like B’. Thus, the fi rst comparison can be considered covert, the 
second clearly is overt (ibid.).
Analogical modeling (AM in the literature) assumes a peculiar position 
among the linguistic and psychological theories of categorization. While in each 
branch at least two opposing camps exist (in linguistics: symbolic-rule systems 
in the Pinker tradition vs. connectionist models in the Rumelhart tradition; 
in psychology: prototype models in the Rosch tradition vs. exemplar-based 
approaches, cf. Chandler 2002: 52-53), AM sets out from the exemplar-based 
mindset.
4 Analogy in the SPACE corpus
4.1 Data set, methodology, expectations
The SPACE corpus (an acronym for corpus of Specialized and Popular 
ACademic English) has been described extensively elsewhere, for example in this 
journal (Haase 2010). The two main components comprise specialized discourse 
(taken from original publications) and popularized versions of these research 
papers (from a popular-science magazine). The domains are physics (quantum 
physics, particle physics, cosmology) and the biosciences (biochemistry, 
genetics, microbiology).
The methodology employed in a study of this kind is a departure from 
classical corpus studies in the sense that it combines quantitative with qualitative 
methods. In a fi rst step, a subset of texts was extracted from the corpus that 
represents a sample of comparable quantity (word length) in the considered 
domains. This procedure is owed to the fact that analogy is notoriously hard 
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to connect to frequently repeating word classes or collocations. Even though 
the SPACE corpus is POS-tagged (with the Treetagger tagset), no automatic 
procedure exists to extract analogs. The sample was kept rigidly parallel so 
that analogies in specialized and in popular discourse could be compared. In 
a fi nal quantitative step, the source and target domains of the analogies were 
measured according to their semantic complexity. This was carried out using 
the ComplexAna tool in the 2.0 (2014) version. The most current description of 
ComplexAna is Haase (2013).
The following two tables summarize the subset used for this study. Table 3 
displays the two text types in parallel.
domain text type: 
specialized-
academic
code Words text type: 
popular-
academic
code words
physics/quant Experimental 
realization of 
quantum games on a 
quantum computer
0005AX 3,315 Multiple 
choice
0005NS 2,331
physics/cosmol Experimental hints 
of Gravity in Large 
Extra Dimensions?
0007AX 1,833 Pulling 
power
0007NS 1,687
physics/cosmol Implications of 
Gauge Unifi cation 
for Time 
Variation of the Fine 
Structure Constant
0013AX 5,277 Blinding 
fl ash
0013NS 2,026
physics/cosmol The Ultimate 
Fate of Life in 
an Accelerating 
Universe
0023AX 4,282 Never say 
die
0023NS 2,265
physics/cosmol Kinematical solution 
of the UHE-cosmic-
ray puzzle without 
a preferred class of 
inertial observers
0027AX 6,229 After 
Einstein
0027NS 2,603
total 20,936 10,912
Table 3: Subset from the physics component of the SPACE corpus
As can be seen, a subset of only ten texts was selected for which the length 
ratio would be more balanced than with most pairings in the corpus.
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domain text type: 
specialized-
academic
Code words text type: 
popular-
academic
code words
biosc/
biochem
Crystal structure of oxygen-
evolving photosystem Ii from 
Thermosynechococcusvulcanus 
at 3.7-Å resolution
0047PN 5,758 Flower 
power
0047NS 2,269
biosc/
zoo
Hermaphroditic, demasculinized 
frogs after exposure to the 
herbicide atrazine at low 
ecologically relevant doses
0056PN 4,721 Thought 
of food
0056NS 3,279
biosc/
microbio
Biosilica formation in diatoms: 
Characterization of native 
silaffi n-2 and its role in silica 
morphogenesis
0069PN 5,010 Natural 
glass 
0069NS 2,379
biosc/
palaeo
The anthropoid status of a 
primate from the late middle 
Eocene Pondaung Formation 
(Central Myanmar): Tarsal 
evidence
0070PN 4,811 Out of 
asia
0070NS 2,523
biosc/
microbio
Electrical cues regulate the 
orientation and frequency of 
cell division and the rate of 
wound healing in vivo
0071PN 5,384 The body 
electric
0071NS 2,514
total 25,684 12,964
Table 4: Subset from the biosciences component of the SPACE corpus
The initial assumption about the data is that popular texts use more directly 
accessible analogs to facilitate understanding of the in most cases abstract (in the 
case of the physics texts, highly abstract) phenomena observed in the original 
research. Further, the number of expected analogies is higher in the popular 
texts. As these texts are generally shorter, the use of analogy should be structure-
building tool in popular texts but would only have the role of a facilitator in the 
specialized texts.
4.2 Data discussion
In the texts the relevant analogies were identifi ed and collected. Not counted 
were ‘default’ analogies like bottleneck, symmetry break, soft parameter, string, 
spacetime-foam, agricultural runoff, etc. The length of the subcorpus was 
balanced to provide a matching popular/specialized ratio. Since all specialized 
texts are longer than their popular counterparts, the number of identifi ed analogies 
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needs to be calculated in proportion. The popular/specialized ratio concerning 
text length for physics is 0.51; the ratio for the biosciences is 0.5. The selection 
of texts was random but with a balanced ratio in mind because the fi gures are 
different when the entire corpus is concerned, cf. Table 5:
Component mean text length ratio
specialized-academic physics –sample 4,187
popular-academic physics – sample 2,182 0.51
specialized-academic biosciences – sample 5,137
popular-academic biosciences – sample 2,593 0.5
specialized-academic physics – total 4767
popular-academic physics – total 698 0.15
specialized-academic biosciences – total 4,749
popular-academic biosciences – total 515 0.11
Table 5: Comparison of the length and [popular :: specialized] ratios in the sample and in the 
entire corpus
Obviously, in the overall corpus the popular papers are much shorter which 
explains also the drastic differences in the ratios. As for the quantifi cation of 
analogies, the longer popular texts provided thus a better means of comparison. 
A number of cases will be discussed in the following.
Analogy in physics texts
The use of analogy in physics texts is at fi rst glance obvious as mostly 
phenomena are described that are not accessible to human perception either 
because they extend to large-scale structures (in cosmology) or to small-scale 
structures (as in quantum physics). Surprisingly, the analogies in the specialized 
text seem relatively conventionalized and uncreative:
0005AX quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma / this quantum game / The two thresholds 
are analogous to phase transitions. When the amount of entanglement is less 
than the smaller threshold, one is in a classical region. When the amount of 
entanglement lies between the two thresholds, one is in a transition region 
between classical and quantum behavior. The last domain is the fully quantum 
region.
The text explicitly states its main analogy at the outset (a quantum effect is 
related to the prisoner’s dilemma), thresholds are analogous to phase transitions. 
In another example, temperature of inhuman scales is equated to human 
dimensions:
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0013AX The freeze-out temperature TF ~ 0.72 MeV is set roughly by equating 
the weak interaction rate at temperature T to the universe’s expansion rate.
The last example is more interesting as the analogy is more systematic and in 
fact inherent to the model:
0023AX Any lifeform would eventually fry to death in the bath of thermal 
Hawking radiation produced by the de Sitter vacuum Beings of any kind generate 
heat by the process of living / and eventually are unable to dissipate their heat 
in the background of this thermal bath. / The creature must be able to get rid of 
the heat E generated by the computations it performs (4). / The creature will fry 
to death unless it can dissipate the heat E that it creates; / yet continue to radiate 
waste heat into space during its periods of hibernation. The society can remain 
active for a fraction g(t) of its time while hibernating for the remaining 1 - g(t) 
fraction of the time.
The lead analogy goes back to a classic suggestion to equate life with the 
ability to perform computations; however, computations consume energy. This 
gives rise to a cascade of analogies in which life is equated with the computing 
‘creature’ who will either fry in a thermal bath or hibernate.
The observations for the popular texts are quite different. While some of the 
original analogies are preserved as they are integral to the understanding, further 
layering occurs, as in:
0005NS Spice up game theory with a dash of quantum mechanics / game called 
the Prisoners’ Dilemma. / their qubits pointing down, representing their supposed 
solidarity / the jailers measure the state of the qubits. / mathematical elbow grease
Further, visual analogies as they also appear in specialized texts, (cf. 0034AX 
in Section 1) are extended with tactile ones:
0007NS interstellar cloud of gas, / sprinkled with dust grains / Jupiter is 
responsible for sweeping up most of the Solar System’s rogue comets / that 
interstellar grains grow into fl uffy, snowfl ake-like structures / growing 
aggregates were much fl uffi er than expected-more like wriggly fractal strings, or 
“seedlings”, /extremities of the growing fl uff
The core analogy of 0023AX is actually explained in detail:
0023NS thought must be like computation / In Dyson’s defi nition, a hibernating 
organism essentially stops its metabolism entirely, which means it must stop thinking / 
It’s hardly a balmy glow: working from what the supernova data reveals, it’ll be 
something of the order of 10-29 kelvin.
The overall tendency in the physics texts is that most popular texts rely on 
one guiding analogy and follow it through, changing it on the way sometimes 
A REGISTER APPROACH TO ANALOGY IN SCIENCE TEXTS: POPUPLAR VS. SPECIALIZED TEXT TYPES
45
for stylistic effect. The specialized texts establish more straightforward structure 
mappings that are often sporadic.
Analogy in the biosciences texts
The main surprise in this study is the abject lack of analogy-making in 
the specialized bioscience texts. One assumption about this is the apparent 
concreteness of the processes (which are mainly narrated to a level of detail not 
present in the physics texts). Their diffi culty and almost impenetrable quality 
for laypersons is not alleviated by analogy as the phenomena are not abstract, 
though they are highly specialized. In the popular versions, the physics trend can 
be observed as well; often one master analogy is carried through the entire text. 
This can be observed well in the following example:
0047NS splitting of water molecules into oxygen, hydrogen ions and electrons. 
This is the heartbeat of photosynthesis, / the energy required to dismember water 
/ the plant’s photosynthetic machinery / chlorophylls that sit cheek-by-jowl inside 
the chloroplast / the catalytic core dismembered the water molecules bit by bit, 
/ The catalytic core then clicks through the fourth step of the cycle / point the 
system grinds to a halt,
Here the target process of photosynthesis is clearly mapped onto machine 
analog bases. The text makes no secret of it (‘the plant’s photosynthetic 
machinery’).
In the last step of the study, the analogies were subjected to a profi ling of 
semantic complexity. The scores obtained by this (a higher score indicates a 
greater complexity as calculated by the position of the nominal base analogs in 
Wordnet) can then be compared and related to the text type.
mean score 
analogies
mean score 
sample
mean score 
text type
specialized-academic physics 19.4 24 23.61
popular-academic physics 21.12 19.7 19.11
specialized-academic biosciences n/a 27.7 26.28
popular-academic biosciences 19.94 20.04 19.79
Table 6: Semantic complexities for analogies, sample texts and SPACE (total)
The results from the software algorithm show clearly the simplifying role of 
analogy-making. In the specialized physics texts, the analogs score only 19.4, 
the lowest score of all compared text types. Due to their sporadic nature they 
probably need to be simpler than the elaborate and abundant analogies in the 
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popular texts. In fact, the analogies in the popular texts have a higher score than 
their surrounding text (21.12 vs. 19.7). Notoriously high are the scores for the 
texts in the biosciences. Here, abstraction is replaced by extremely complex 
terminology.
5 Conclusion
This contribution has attempted to show that the use and application of 
analogy show marked differences in different genres of academic discourse. 
The initial assumption of analogs structuring scientifi c thinking (for which there 
is abundant evidence from the natural sciences as well as from the cognitive 
sciences which set out to study this correspondence) can be manifestly said 
only for popular depictions of science. Analogy-making is in fact undeveloped 
in academic texts in the biosciences and relatively erratic in physics. However, 
all popular text types show interesting and creative variation that elevates their 
semantic complexity even over the texts in which they appear. A caveat, however, 
may be that the disappointing yield for the biosciences is due to the small sample. 
Endnote
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